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Court RulingsHonorable Judge Susan Cook's ruling of Department of Licensing Appeal.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOHN M. MEYER MICHAEL E. RICKERT SUSAN K. COOK DAVID R. NEEDY COURT SOMMISSIONER DELILAH M. GEORGE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
December 6, 2005 Mr. Corbin T. Volluz Mr. Matthew J. Daheim Assistant Attorney General 103 East Hotly Street, Suite 310 Bellingham, WA 98225
Re: Jody Hutchison v. State of WA/Dept. of Licensing Dear Counsel, I have now reviewed the materials submitted in connection with Petitioner’s request for an order reversing the Department of Licensing’s (DOL’s) suspension of his driver’s license. The request is granted. A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. And an independent tribunal is a concept even more ancient than our Due Process Clause. State v. Moreno, 147 W2d 500,507 (2002). Here, it is apparent that Mr. Hutchison was deprived of an independent decision-maker. And as a result, he was deprived of due process. The facts are fairly straightforward. Mr. Hutchison was stopped on August 5, 2005, arrested for DUI, received implied consent warnings and took a breath test indicating alcohol concentration above the legal limit. The DOL suspended Hutchison’s license. Prior to the administrative hearing to contest his license suspension, Hutchison was charged with DUI in Mount Vernon Municipal Court. During those proceeding~, Judge Skelton found RCW 46.61.506 unconstitutional and, because the State could not lay the necessary foundation for admissibility without that statute, suppressed the BAC results. At the administrative hearing Hutchison asked the DOL Hearing Qfficer to give collateral estoppel effect to Judge Skelton’s rulings. The Department of Licensing Hearing Officer, Kathryn Koehler, found that Judge Skelton’s order “does not bind the Hearing Officer on this issue pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Her decision was apparently dictated by a policy statement from her supervisor, Craig A. Nelson, which stated “the official decision of the hearings unit is that we will not observe a collateral estoppel affect (sic) on pure constitutionality arguments.” It is clear from Hearing Officer Koehler’s email of May 12, 2005, that her legal analysis of the collateral estoppel issue differed dramatically from that of her boss. There she said “I do not believe that I can in good conscience not give effect to a suppression order on the constitutional issue.” That same day she wrote about Nelson’s directive “…I understand I am bound to follow his dictate, but with the words to the effect that it is his official decision.” (emphasis in original). In justifying his directive, Administrator Nelson said “it is important that the Hearing Officers ‘speak with one voice’ on legal issues. This is in order to prevent contradictory legal results depending on what hearing officer is assigned to a case, or what area of the state the driver lives in.” While that is a laudable goal, Administrator Nelson’s tactics are no more acceptable than that of a presiding judge who orders the judges on his/her bench to decide certain legal issues in a given uniform way. To the extent that the directive deprives the litigants of an independent decision-maker, it deprives them of due process. The State argues that even if Hearing Officer Koehler substituted Administrator Nelson’s decision for her own, it doesn’t matter because the decision was legally correct. This overlooks the fact that Hearing Officer Koehler had no opportunity to consider whether the issue presented to her was identical to the issue in Municipal Court or whether an injustice would result from following the Municipal Court’s order. Apparently, she applied Administrator Nelson’s directive to the case without an independent analysis. Clearly, if she had been permitted to look at the collateral estoppel issue independently, the hearing officer could very easily have concluded that both she and Judge Skelton had to decide identical issues, i.e., what foundation was necessary for the admissibility of the BAC results. She also could have concluded that because both parties to the prior litigation had a full and fair hearing of the issues and neither attempted to overturn an adverse outcome, that application of collateral estoppel would not work an injustice. This is an egregious due process violation. There is no point to remand since 1 cannot in good conscience ask a hearing officer to ignore her supervisor’s mandate. The hearing examiner’s decision is reversed. Sincerely, SUSAN K. COOK SKC/hs |
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